Indiana Law Journal
Volume 9

Issue 3

Article 8

12-1933

Res Judicata -Privies-What Might have been Adjudicated was
Adjudicated

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
(1933) "Res Judicata -Privies-What Might have been Adjudicated was Adjudicated," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 9 : Iss. 3 , Article 8.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol9/iss3/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

RECENT CASE NOTES
the accident victim certainly is not and there is a strong equity in favor
3
Also, there is involved in such cases an
of an involuntary creditor.1
important public policy in the security of the people---"Salus populi suprem&
4
lex"-outweighing that of keeping the railroad a "going concern."'1 Furthermore, the very income in question was produced by exercising the
franchise granted by the state to the railroad company, to which adhere
inseparably certain duties and liabilities and which is answerable, out of
15
revenues produced by its exercise, for torts commited in its exercise.
While cotra cases go on the theory of benefit to the mortgagee, they disregard altogether the correlative burdens.16 Receivership is an equitable
doctrine and must be administered equitably,17 and tort claims, being of a
5
peculiarly meritorious nature,' should be favorably considered by chancery.
By coming into equity to ask receivership, the mortgage creditors agreed
to submit to all superior equities and to all necessary incidents of good
9
The liability
management, one of which is payment of valid tort claims.1
which the law creates in such cases is not inferior in merit to a debt arising
2
out of a contract. 0
The tendency of the later and better-reasoned cases is to allow tort
claims to be classed as operating expenses and, as such, given priority over
mortgage liens, so that the decision in the principal case seems right on
authority (though the cases are not numerous) and on principle. M. C. M.
RES JUDICATA-PRIVIES-WHAT MIGHT HAvE BEEN ADJUDICATED WAS
ADJUDIcATED-After the death of a testator in 1905, the trustees under
his will brought an action in 1906 for the construction thereof, making the
widow, daughter and the daughter's two children parties defendant. The
court construed the will to provide a life estate in the income from the
land to the widow, a certain sum for life to the daughter if she should
survive, and the trustees to retain title to the land until the two grandchildren, who were specifically named in the will, reached twenty-one, paying them support, etc., and the fee to go to them on attaining that age.
The widow survived the daughter, dying in 1929. Shortly thereafter, appellants, sons of the daughter by a later marriage and not in being at the
time of testator's death, filed a partition suit alleging that they were each
owners of an undivided one-fourth of the real estate. The lower court held
they were bound by the prior judgment. On appeal, they contend that the
court did not actually determine whether the provisions as to the trustee's
holding title until the appellees, the two named grandchildren, were twentyone was a restraint on alienation, and hence, the decree was not
res judicata. Held, bound by the prior decree.'
This holding is entirely in accord with a long line of Indiana authorities,
and is a recognition of the rule that "what might have been adjudicated
1

3Green v. Coast Line R. Co. (1895), 97 Ga. 15, 24 S. E. 814.

2AIbid.

Ibid.
Is Ibid.
V Fosdick v. Schall (1878), 9 Otto (99 U. S.) 235.
I Ex parte Brown (1880), 15 S. C. 518.
'9Ibid.

2 Ibid.
Reynolds v. Lee Appellate Court of Indiana, June 28, 1933, 186 N. E. 337.
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was adjudicated."2 The rule is a wise and necessary one, discouraging
contentious litigation as to matters that might previously have been raised
in a law suit but were not, due to carelessness of attorneys or litigants,
spite, negelect or some other reason. It is not necessary, as between the
parties and their privies, that the record should show the question upon
which the right of the plaintiff to recover or the validity of the defense
depended; but only that the same matter in controversy might have been
litigated.3 So long as the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject-matter, and the question now sought to be raised was within the
issues and thus might have been raised on the issues, then it is forever
barred as a subject of collateral attack on the prior judgment. The question frequently arises in connection with the splitting of causes of action
where the plaintiff sues for only a part of the sum due and is later barred
from suing for the balance since he might have recovered the entire
amount in the first action. However, it applies with equal force in actions
involving the title to land, for the necessity for security of title is very
strong in such cases.
Thus, where a defendant in a partition suit, files a cross-complaint setting up equitable liens on the land, an answer showing that the matters
alleged in such cross-complaint were or might have be~n litigated in a
former suit for partition of the same land between substantially the same
parties claiming respectively the same shares by the same title, is a bar
to the action. 4 Where an administrator filed a petition for sale of decedent's
realty and present plaintiff was made a party defendant thereto and failed
to set up or assert his lien for taxes, he can not thereafter bring an action
to foreclose such lien as he is bound by the prior adjudication since he
might have set up such lien therein. 5 In a suit to quiet title based on the
terms of a will, where it appeared that the will had been construed by
consent, of the parties in a previous suit, a decree therein was held binding
in the suit to quiet title notwithstanding the pleadings in the former suit
did not put in issue the present plaintiff's right to the real estate under the
will. 6 Once a will has been construed and no appeal taken from the decree
entered in such proceedings, the construction thereof can not be later raised
in any other type of proceeding as to any matter that was or could have
been presented in the former action. 7
The rule must be limited, however, to fully protect the rights of the
parties. Thus, res judicata applies only to such matters as were within
the issues of the former action.S Even where a finding was made in a
2FlschlI v. Flschli (1825), 1 Blackf. 360, 12 Am. Dec. 251; Elwood v. Beymer
(1884), 100 Ind. 504; Vail v. Rinehart (1885), 105 Ind. 6,4 N. E. 218; Kurtz v.
Carr (1885), 105 Ind. 574, 5 N. E. 692; Maynard v. Wairdlich (1900), 156 Ind. 562,
60 N. E. 348; Cannon v. Castlem'an (1903), 162 Ind. 7, 69 N. E. 455; Comparet v.
Hanna (1870), 34 Ind. 74; Isbell v. Stewart (1890), 125 Ind. 112, 25 N. E. 160;
Hedges v. Hehrlng (1917). 65 Ind. App. 586, 115 N. E. 433; Largura v. Deutsch
(1931
Ind. App.), 176 N. E. 39.
3
Washington A & G Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles (1860), 65 U. S. 333.
Elwood v. B3eymer (1884), 100 Ind. 504.
5Vail v. Rinehart (1885), 105 Ind. 6,4 N. E. 218.
v. Jean (1921 Ind. App.), 132 N. E. 704.
6Burrill
7
Nelmo v. Turner (1923), 309 Il1. 613, 139 N. E. 900.
'Moore v. State ex rel. Miller (1827), 114 Ind. 414, 16 N. E. 836. It must be
noted that the Issues are not necessarily determined by the record, but by the evidence as well.

RECENT CASE NOTES
former action, if it was not within the issues and no attempt 9was made
So, too,
to carry it into the judgment rendered, it is not res judicata.
0
the judgment in the former action must be on the merits.'
If the decree in the former action stipulates that it should not be conclusive, then it is no bar to further proceedings. Hence, in a construction
of a will, where the decree so stipulated, a party to such decree was later
allowed to bring a suit to quiet title to land involved in the former decree
Where
and raise matters which might have been adjudicated therein."
two or more defendants make issues with a plaintiff, a judgment determining those issues in favor of the defendants does not settle between the
defendants any fact that might have been, but was not put in issue by a
proper pleading.12
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear that the decision
is sound. In finding that the named grandchildren took a fee on attaining
the age of twenty-one, the court must necessarily have found that such
interest was valid, and the postponement of the vesting thereof not a
violation of the rule against restraints on alienation, even though the question was not actually passed upon. It could have been, and should have been
raised therein and to allow it now would be to allow collateral attack on a
judgment from which no appeal had been taken.
The only other question presented is one of representation, i. e., whether
these plaintiffs, after-born children of the daughter, were sufficiently represented to be bound by the former decree. The only way in which they can
and do claim any interest in the realty is as heirs of the daughter. The
daughter was a party to the former decree, had the opportunity to raise the
question and had she brought this suit, she would have been bound. One
claiming in privity with another, whether by blood, estate or law, occupies
the same situation with such other as to any judgment for or against him
and the record of the judgment is equally admissible as evidence against
either. Privies, within the meaning of the rule of res judicata, are
persons who have mutual or successive relationship to the same right or
thing, who claim through or under the parties to the former action and
whose interests were acquired subsequent to the commencement of such
an action.13 There is a long line of authorities holding that an heir is
bound by a decree against an ancestor, so that question is no longer open.14
Children, however, are bound by judgments for or against their parents
only where they claim from, through or under their parents.15 Here, it is
clear that appellants were claiming under their mother, a party to the
former action, and the court was clearly correct in holding they were
P. C. R.
bound by such decree entered therein.
'Trook v. Crouch (1924), 82 Ind. ,App. 309, 137 N. E. 773.
'Keokuk Ry. Co. v. Donnell (1889), 77 Iowa 221.
v. Busick (1917), 65 Ind. App. 655, 115 N. E. 1025, 116 N. E. 861.
UBusick
12
Whitesell v. Strickler (1916), 167 Ind. 602, 78 N. E. 845. Quere: Whether
now even a counterclaim which might have been filed by one defendant against
another is barred on the principles of res Judicata by some of the later decisions.
" 34 C. J. 973 and cases cited.
it State v. St. Louis (1598), 145 Mo. 551, 46 S. W. 981, 42 L. R. A. 113; Henderson County v. Henderson Bridge Co. (1903), 116 Ky. 164, 75 S. W. 239, 105 Am.
St. Rep. 197; Tadlock v. Eccles (1858), 20 Tex. 782, 73 Am. Dec. 213; Otherweln v.
Thomas (1889), 127 Ill. 554, 21 N. E. 430; Genz v. Genz (1912), 254 Ill. 161, 98
N. B. 272.
"34 C. J. 1022 and cases cited.

